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A B S T R A C T
Traditionally, studies examining decision-making heuristics and biases (H&B) have focused on aggregate eﬀects
using between-subjects designs in order to demonstrate violations of rationality. Although H&B are often studied
in isolation from others, emerging research has suggested that stable and reliable individual diﬀerences in ra-
tional thought exist, and similarity in performance across tasks are related, which may suggest an underlying
phenotypic structure of decision-making skills. Though numerous theoretical and empirical classiﬁcations have
been oﬀered, results have been mixed. The current study aimed to clarify this research question. Participants
(N= 289) completed a battery of 17 H&B tasks, assessed with a within-subjects design, that we selected based
on a review of prior empirical and theoretical taxonomies. Exploratory and conﬁrmatory analyses yielded a
solution that suggested that these biases conform to a model composed of three dimensions: Mindware gaps,
Valuation biases (i.e., Positive Illusions and Negativity eﬀect), and Anchoring and Adjustment. We discuss these
ﬁndings in relation to proposed taxonomies and existing studies on individual diﬀerences in decision-making.
Studies in the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) pio-
neering heuristics and biases (H&B) research program have demon-
strated that individuals may violate rules and axioms stated by models
of normative rationality, such as Expected Utility Theory (Von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). Such ﬁndings suggest that decisions
are often bounded by a limited set of information that is available to the
decision-maker (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972, 1979; Stanovich & West, 2007; Stanovich & West,
2008a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This “Bounded Rationality” is
considered to be adaptive, frequently resulting in accurate, expeditious
and sometimes even superior choices and judgements (Gigerenzer,
1996; Simon, 1956). However, applying these heuristics indis-
criminately can lead to judgmental errors and suboptimal decision-
making, which may prove to be costly at either a personal or societal
level (Simon, 1991).
Although the examination of robust eﬀects in the decision-making
literature, such as Framing eﬀect and the Representativeness heuristic,
has increased our understanding of human decision processes
(Kahneman et al., 1982), these studies have largely been conducted
from a between-subjects experimental design. Moreover, these biases
rarely have been studied in relation to one another. To the best of our
knowledge, only a few attempts have been made to investigate the
associations across disparate H&B paradigms. In the limited research
available, factor-analytic studies have often reported the emergence of
two latent factors, but usually belonging to diﬀerent cognitive models.
For example, Weaver and Stewart (2012) distinguished two clusters of
competence in judgment and decision-making tasks that they labeled
“Correspondence” (i.e., accuracy in responses) and “Coherence” (i.e.,
consistency in responses). In contrast, Teovanović, Knežević, and
Stankov (2015), using another battery of H&B tasks, presented a dif-
ferent distinction between other two rationality forms (i.e., “Norma-
tive” and “Ecological”; Gigerenzer, 1996; Gilovich, Griﬃn, &
Kahneman, 2002).
These and other empirical bi- or single-factor solutions (e.g., Bruine
de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoﬀ, 2007; Slugoski, Shields, & Dawson,
1993), present varying interpretations about the degree to which dif-
ferent H&B relate to one another. Indeed, these studies have been
mainly designed to advance the literature of individual diﬀerences, by
integrating intelligence measures with few bias tasks. For such a reason,
individuated solutions appear to be the result of theoretical appro-
priateness more than evidence in support of a solid bias structure. This
ﬁnds conﬁrmation in the low variance explained by the rotated
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solutions (see Teovanović et al., 2015). The missing explained variance
suggests the presence of several underlying processes, which are in-
trinsically related to H&B tasks used to detect them. Often the battery of
tasks in these studies is purely indicative and non-exhaustive of all
biases present in the literature. Furthermore, these empirical studies
exclude the theoretical approach of bias taxonomies (Arnott, 2006;
Baron, 2000; Carter, Kaufmann, & Michel, 2007; Gilovich et al., 2002;
Oreg & Bayazit, 2009; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 2008) as a starting
point for developing a comprehensive battery of bias tasks.
On the contrary, the present work, starting from taxonomic studies
of biases, overcome these limits by ﬁrst theoretically examining the
degree to which speciﬁc inter-related dimensions of H&B are common
in the literature, and next to empirically conﬁrm them. This study ad-
vances research on individual diﬀerences in reasoning in several ways.
First, identifying relationships between diﬀerent H&B could lead to the
detection of common underlying mechanisms that drive these biases.
Second, even though this study was not designed to test a speciﬁc
theoretical framework, the breadth of the decision tasks used oﬀers the
potential to support assertions from several cognitive models.
Ultimately, adopting a wider categorization of H&B may allow future
research to investigate more precisely the predictive validity of speciﬁc
decision processes that may impact real-world decision outcomes.
1. Literature review
Before introducing the dimensions found, we shortly describe dif-
ferent approaches present in the literature for grouping H&B. We start
with some classic studies on individual diﬀerences and biases since they
allowed detecting the ﬁrst decision-making categories present in lit-
erature (e.g., “Positive Illusions”, “Negativity eﬀect”, “Mindware
gaps”). Cognitive models (e.g., “Dual process theory”) used to support
empirical classiﬁcations are brieﬂy introduced in the second section of
the review. The third section presents theoretical taxonomies, featured
by more than two classes of H&B. Finally, the last part of the review
resumes the few empirical studies which attempted to detect a latent
structure behind some bias eﬀects.
In order to illustrate the structure of the present literature review,
Table 1 shows the diﬀerent study's methodologies for clustering H&B
with their respective pros and cons.
1.1. Individual diﬀerences and categories of H&B: the role of cognitive
skills, inclinations and personality
Although it has led to novel and valuable insights about human
decision processes, the traditional between-subjects experimental
approach used to assess H&B has minimized the potential role of in-
dividual diﬀerences. However, research has suggested that a great deal
of heterogeneity of responses on these tasks exists, and these diﬀerences
may reﬂect stable dispositional characteristics in the tendency to re-
spond in a normative manner (e.g., Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola,
2002; Parker & Fischhoﬀ, 2005; Slugoski et al., 1993). Considering this
perspective, researchers have used several well-known decision-making
paradigms, utilizing within-subjects designs by combining them with
individual diﬀerences measures. Such research aimed to identify the
tendency to apply heuristic processing across a variety of H&B tasks and
measure of intelligence, personality traits or behavioral inclinations.
1.1.1. Cognitive ability and reasoning fallacies
Consistent evidence has been found on the performance between
tasks involved in some biases and diﬀerent cognitive ability measures.
Stanovich and his colleagues have deeply contributed to enlighten the
role of individual diﬀerences in H&B (Stanovich & West, 2003;
Stanovich & West, 2008b; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; West &
Stanovich, 2003). In their studies, decision problems, such as the “Linda
problem” (i.e., Conjunction fallacy; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) and
Framing eﬀects such as the “Asian Disease” problem (i.e., Risky-Choice
Framing; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), or the “80% Lean/20% Fat
Ground Beef” (i.e., Attribute Framing; Levin & Gaeth, 1988), have been
used. Results have shown that individuals high in general academic
achievement (measured via SAT scores) were substantially less likely to
exhibit biases such as the Conjunction fallacy or Base rate fallacy
(Stanovich & West, 1998a, 1998b). Certaintly, cognitive ability can be
particularly helpful for avoiding certain kinds of biases, which emerge
in probabilistic reasoning and in processing complex information. These
cognitive fallacies are known as Mindware gaps (Stanovich, 2009) or
Simpliﬁcation biases (Oreg & Bayazit, 2009), and they are the result of
a substitution of an analytic process for a more accessible heuristic one
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Basically, these choices are systematic
departures from what is normatively considered to be rational beha-
vior.
1.1.2. Biases as result of symmetrical coping strategies
Research on the role of individual diﬀerences in H&B does not limit
just to cognitive skills and reasoning fallacies. Several studies have
demonstrated relationships between character's dispositions and dis-
torsions such as “Self-Serving biases” (Giesler, Josephs, & Swann, 1996;
Kobayashi & Brown, 2003; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003; Suls,
Lemos, & Stewart, 2002; Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003). A large
portion of research has shown how people with high self-esteem are
more likely to show Self-Serving biases than those who report lower
Table 1
Diﬀerent approaches present in the literature for grouping H&B with respective potentials and limits.
Deﬁnition and notable examples Potentials (+) and Limitations (−)
Single decision-making
categories
Single categories of H&B usually composed between one and seven biases featured by
similar eﬀects or a common theoretical cause (e.g., Self-Serving or Positive Illusions by
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Negativity eﬀect by Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Mindware gaps
by Stanovich, 2009).
+ Mostly based on individual diﬀerences evidence
− They include just few biases without considering
them in relation to other H&B categories
− Lack of multicausality on the bias generation process
Cognitive models The decision-making literature often suggests models based on (mostly two) separable
but interdependent reasoning systems (e.g., Hammond's, 1996, theory; Dual process
theory by Kahneman, 2003b; Tripartite model by Stanovich, 2009).
+ Strong theoretical grounding
− Oversimpliﬁcation of H&B processes
− Mostly cognitive oriented
Theoretical taxonomies Theoretical classiﬁcations of biases which consider more than just two H&B categories
(see Arnott, 2006; Baron, 2000; Carter et al., 2007; Gilovich et al., 2002; Oreg &
Bayazit, 2009; Stanovich et al., 2008).
+ Larger list of H&B
− Lack of multicausality
− Presence of diﬀerent labels for similar biases and
categories
− Absence of a common criteria of categorization
Empirical classiﬁcations Empirical studies based on the examination of relationships between H&B tasks (see
Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Slugoski et al., 1993; Teovanović et al., 2015; Weaver &
Stewart, 2012)
+ Evidence based-approach
+ Multicausality allowed
− Small number of tasks usually submitted to factor
analyses
− Limited consistency among the diﬀerent tasks
selected in each study
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self-esteem (for a review see Oreg & Bayazit, 2009). Self-Serving biases
are also known as Positive Illusions by Taylor and Brown (1988) and
they consist of fallacies such as Optimism bias, Illusion of Superiority
(as known as Better than average eﬀect) and of Control, related to a
form of an unrealistic optimism and trust about future events and
personal skills. Opposite to them, the dimension, labeled the Negativity
eﬀect by Rozin and Royzman (2001) was created to include biases as-
sociated by an exaggerated reaction toward the avoidance of negative
outcomes caused by self-depreciation. This adaptive coping strategy
neutralizes the greater negative potency of losses by anticipating ne-
gative feelings, such as regret or delusion, for minimizing eﬀects of
potential failings (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Leone, Perugini, & Bagozzi,
2005; Loomes & Sugden, 1982).
1.1.3. Personality and multicausality in H&B
Personality has been also considered a possible predictor of some H
&B. For instance, considering the Anchoring heuristic, the change in
judgment, which is based upon external cues, seems particularly re-
levant and related to the openness-to-experience personality trait
(Furnham & Boo, 2011). Literature reviews that investigated the eﬀect
of personality traits on anchoring demonstrated that participants high
in openness to experience are more susceptible to the eﬀect of the an-
chor (McElroy & Dowd, 2007). On the other hand, biases can be the
results of multiple underlying factors, since the same anchoring eﬀect
seems to decrease with higher cognitive abilities (Bergman, Ellingsen,
Johannesson, & Svensson, 2010). It is possible that people with higher
cognitive abilities would be more likely to understand the psychology
behind an anchoring task (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009).
Sometimes even the same bias, in its multiple forms, can be due to
diﬀerent predictors. For instance, diﬀerent types of framing (e.g., At-
tribute framing, Goal framing, Risky choice framing) derive from dif-
ferent processes and they seem to depend diﬀerently to personality
predictors as well (e.g., people scoring high on neuroticism show the
largest Risky choice framing eﬀect, compare to Goal framing for in-
stance; see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Overall, while this re-
search has helped to gain more and more information over these eﬀects,
these studies are isolated, and categories detected lack an all-embracing
theory that incorporates a larger spectrum of biases.
1.2. Cognitive models and H&B origins
From a theoretical perspective, the H&B literature often relies on
dual-process theories, which suggest the existence of separable, but
interdependent reasoning systems, now commonly labeled “System 1”
and “System 2” to reﬂect associative versus controlled processes, re-
spectively (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Whereas System 2 processing is abstract, slow and computationally
expensive, System 1 processing contributes to decision-making by
evoking images (often emotionally-laden), stereotypes and heuristics.
As a result, System 1 generates eﬃcient responses that allow the deci-
sion-maker to arrive at judgments without expending a large amount of
cognitive resources, but often with less accuracy and missing of ana-
lytical processes governed by System 2.
This distinction regarding the presence of two systems is important
for several reasons. First, this diﬀerence represents the theoretical
backdrop of the H&B tradition, with the demonstration that bias eﬀects
are often viewed as evidence of System 1 processes. Second, research
shows a distinction between H&B that more heavily recruit either
System 1 or System 2 processes (Stanovich et al., 2008). Even if it is a
common error to consider that only System 1 is responsible of all
possible H&B, the rapid System 1 is indeed implicated with most known
biases. Stanovich, West, and Toplak (2011) distinguish diﬀerent pro-
cesses in this system that can lead to diﬀerent types of biases, and they
are: hard-wired processes (i.e., grounded on evolutionary adaptation
and mostly based on heuristics), emotion regulation processes which
reﬂect biases typically based on impulsively associative thinking and
vividness eﬀects, and ﬁnally processes which belong to behavioral re-
pertoires or developed through implicit learning. In contrast, cognitive
processes which sustain the computationally-taxing System 2 can be
aﬀected, for instance, by Mindware gaps, incorrect/incomplete prob-
ability, and statistical knowledge, hence, leading to other biases (e.g.,
Base rate fallacy and Conjunction fallacy). Nevertheless, Kahneman
(2013a) recognized that both System 1 and System 2 together can re-
inforce non-normative reasoning. For instance, System 1 often produces
inferences based on limited evidence, which then can be endorsed by
System 2.
Kahneman (2003a) on the other hand – based on Hammond's
(1996) theory – recognized in another main distinction two forms of
rationality diﬀerently able to prevent the emergence of H&B. Namely:
“Reasoning rationality” and “Coherence rationality”. The former pre-
vents inaccuracy in judgment and the latter is related to low frequency
in biases caused by logical inconsistency (i.e., non-normative rea-
soning). Conversely, the ABC research group, historically counterposed
to the Kahneman and Tversky H&B thesis, has proposed “Ecological
rationality” as an additional and diﬀerent perspective to redeﬁne the
normative standards (Gigerenzer, 1998; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009;
Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). Ecological rationality is seen as the result of
the adaptive ﬁt between the environment and human mind. Within this
evolutionary paradigm focusing on adaptive behavior, H&B are not
considered as errors deriving from cognitive processing, but the result
of highly constrained conditions due to experimental settings. Cognitive
biases would emerge as a natural form of adaptive rationality, due to
responsiveness to feedbacks, adjustive processes toward external in-
formation, and calibration in conﬁdence judgments (Teovanović et al.,
2015).
Considering the presence of multiple expressions of rationality, H&B
performance can be conceptualized as a collection of processes them-
selves than the merely expression of two cognitive processes. In light of
this, Stanovich (2009), has proposed the “Tripartite model”, which
includes System 1 as “Autonomous” processes, but also subdivided
System 2 into “Reﬂective” and “Algorithmic” processes. In this con-
ceptualization, the Reﬂective processes are involved in general
knowledge structures, person's beliefs, and in the reﬂective develop-
ment of goal structure, whereas the Algorithmic mind manages cogni-
tive strategies and ordinated behavioral rules. Such structure, as the
author stated, would represent also: “the beginning of a way of con-
sidering a taxonomy of the causes of cognitive failure related to rational
behavior that would consider more-than two processes” (p. 71).
1.3. Across theoretical taxonomies of multiple distinguished processes of H&
B
Apart from cognitive models, as seen mostly dichotomous, a number
of theoretical taxonomies of H&B suggest that the universe of H&B is
heterogeneous, and probably they imply more than just two categories.
Arnott (2006)1 established the ﬁrst theoretical review of basic classi-
ﬁcations of biases (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1987; Remus & Kottemann,
1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), focusing on the departures from
rationality in order to cluster them. The review was developed for a
speciﬁc ﬁeld such as the computer science domain, with the aim of
establishing all the normative violations executed by human beings
compared to machines. The Arnott's taxonomy is not the only classiﬁ-
cation of H&B developed for a speciﬁc ﬁeld. Carter et al. (2007) es-
tablished one, concerning decision biases that can aﬀect managerial
decision-making, whereas Zhang, Patel, Johnson, and Shortliﬀe (2004)
1 The ﬁrst classiﬁcations' review by Arnott was developed in 1996 and it was
mostly based on “classic H&B” such as Availability, Representativeness and
Anchoring heuristics and connected biases. It was published as a discussion
paper by the Monash University, School of Information Management and
Systems, Caulﬁeld (AU).
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developed one related to medical errors. Such taxonomies reported si-
milar H&B categories beyond ﬁelds of study, by highlighting the pre-
sence of a possible common structure. On the other hand, in developing
independent theoretical taxonomies based on more than two classes, a
common potential diﬃculty emerged. As noted by Baron (2008) about
this issue: “is the possibility that biases could be present in more than one
category” (p. 55). For instance, some H&B may be due to multiple
processes (Baron, 2008; Stanovich et al., 2008). As an example, the
Framing eﬀect is considered a bias of “Presentation” (i.e., responses
dependent on the way in which information is perceived and processed)
in more than one taxonomy (Arnott, 2006; Carter et al., 2007), but it is
also related to the Prospect Theory's value function (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Thus, Framing eﬀects may involve multiple underlying
processes. Beyond the reference point dependence of the Framing ef-
fect, the inference that motivates the choice is typically emotional and
it is connected to concepts such as gains and losses. Moreover, theo-
retical classiﬁcations present a second and opposite issue, that is the
presence of two biases in diﬀerent classes for what concern a taxonomy,
and where the same biases might belong to a unique category in an-
other taxonomy. For instance, in Arnott (2006) taxonomy, the Con-
junction and the Base rate fallacy were collocated in a category named
“Statistical biases”, instead, in the taxonomy proposed by Carter et al.
(2007) these two biases are included in two diﬀerent and distinct
classes (i.e., “Control illusion”, “Base rate”). In the end, a common issue
among all the classiﬁcations is that the same bias, or the same con-
ceptual dimension may assume diﬀerent names in diﬀerent taxonomies
(e.g., concerning dimensions: “Reference point” and “Adjustment”, or
about biases: Illusion of Superiority and Better than average eﬀect. See
Arnott, 2006; Carter et al., 2007).
The absence of common criteria for theoretical categorization
makes the process of comparison between biases very diﬃcult. For this
reason, Stanovich et al. (2008) called for greater methodological ana-
lyses to support theoretical taxonomies. Starting from the Tripartite
model (Stanovich, 2009), they developed a taxonomy of thinking errors
combining biases with diﬀerent cognitive processes. For example, they
investigated Mindware gaps by avoiding to circumscribe them to just
one class of belonging, but as the result of two processes: a lack of
alternative thinking and of probability knowledge. Following Stano-
vich's tradition, the taxonomy relies on multicausality of biases thanks
to several empirical studies carried out by the authors in the last dec-
ades with the aim of understanding the diﬀerent origins of H&B
(Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2008a,
2008b; Toplak et al., 2011). Similarly, a classiﬁcation by Oreg and
Bayazit (2009) relies on a review of individual diﬀerences studies in H&
B and it presents three main dimensions as well, “Simpliﬁcation biases”,
“Veriﬁcation biases”, “Regulation biases”. Whereas Simpliﬁcation
biases may be considered elements similar to Mindware gaps, the no-
velty is represented by the other two categories. Veriﬁcation biases are
distortions in people's perceptions – either in a positive or in a negative
way – of themselves and of the world around them. Regulation biases
instead are deﬁned as inclinations toward coping behaviors well ex-
amined in the risky decision-making literature, such as Endowment
eﬀect or the Framing eﬀect. A peculiarity of such a taxonomy is the
presence of casual order between these classes. For instance, Veriﬁca-
tion biases are involved in the Regulation biases development, since
they inﬂuence the interpretation of events they can have an impact on
resulting reactions and behaviors.
1.4. Presence and limits of empirical dimensions in H&B (two, one, none?)
Similar to the heterogeneity of theoretical classiﬁcations, schemes,
empirical studies have also yielded mixed results. To our knowledge,
the ﬁrst study investigating such an issue is Slugoski et al. (1993),
which included a battery of seven H&B tasks and three measures of
conditional reasoning. Results indicated a two-factor solution, which
they were labeled as the two heuristics: “Availability” and
“Representativeness”, and biases loaded moderately onto these two
factors. Based on another H&B battery, also Weaver and Stewart (2012)
distinguished the presence of two factors, but they interpreted them the
two underlying rational competences distinguished by Hammond
(1996): Coherence and Correspondence (as known as Reasoning ra-
tionality in Kahneman, 2003a). As Hammond (1996) argued both
Correspondence and Coherence competences are necessary for good
judgment and decision-making. Still, they can be conceived as two in-
dependent cognitive processes, in which Coherence, as the study
showed, is negatively associated to H&B based on probabilistic in-
formation, such as Base rate fallacy or Conjunction fallacy. On the other
hand, the Correspondence factor was less explained by H&B tasks'
variance and it loaded more on digit span test score, which is closer to
the traditional intelligence idea. Results were in line with Hammond's
(1996) theory which states that Correspondence competence, as in-
telligence, is mostly an inborn quality, whereas Coherence competence
is usually learned across the lifespan and it is more depend by the en-
vironment. Authors concluded that, although more than one factor is
required to account for judgment and decision-making, individual dif-
ferences represented by cognitive skills are involved to some extent
(although not equally) in diﬀerent judgment tasks. Using diﬀerent H&B
tasks, Teovanović et al. (2015) also reported a two-factor solution,
which they labeled Normative and Ecological rationality (Gigerenzer,
1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In this conceptualization, higher
scores on the ﬁrst factor (i.e., Normative rationality) were believed to
indicate higher rates of predictably irrational responses, whereas sub-
jects high on the second factor (i.e., Ecological rationality) were more
prone to change their initial answers toward subsequently given ex-
ternal information, such as in the Anchoring heuristic and Hindsight
bias.
Deviating from results suggesting coherent patterns of inter-
relationships, Aczel, Bago, Szollosi, Foldes, and Lukacs (2015) sug-
gested that a robust factor of H&B may not exist, citing poor reliability
across presumably equivalent items of the same construct. Contrary to
multidimensional solutions, studies have reported signiﬁcant inter-
correlations between diﬀerent H&B tasks, indirectly suggesting that
they may occupy unidimensional space (Klaczynski, 2001). More di-
rectly, the “Decision-Making Competence” approach has reported that a
one-factor solution may reasonably account for variation across deci-
sion-making tasks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Although illuminating,
it is important to note that the Decision-Making Competence battery
does not represent a test for the entire universe of H&B. The instrument
only partially embodies traditional H&B tasks (e.g., like the Kahneman
and Tversky's original “Big 3”: Representativeness, Availability, and
Anchoring with insuﬃcient adjustment; see Kahneman & Tversky,
1973). Although “Resistance to Framing” and “Resistance to Sunk-
Costs” are included in Decision-Making Competence inventory, it pre-
sents also other measures such as “Applying Decision Rules” and “Re-
cognizing Social Norms” (even if they are not easily characterized as H
&B). Moreover, the Decision-Making Competence battery was not de-
veloped in order to provide an exhaustive account of the phenotypic
structure of normative responding, rather they may be considered as a
representative collection of measures believed to assess several core
abilities.
Taken together, the existing literature currently shows some level of
disagreement regarding the number of factors that can optimally ac-
count for diﬀerent types of bias. Although these empirical classiﬁca-
tions have provided valuable insights into the understanding of the
interrelations between H&B tasks, two methodological limitations must
be considered. First, across research, there has been limited consistency
among the diﬀerent tasks assessed in each study (I). This inconsistency
precludes the ability to make robust generalizations about the factor
structure of rational thought. The second limitation regards the small
number of tasks usually submitted to factor analyses (II). Most of the
studies have used about seven to ten tasks. Considering that best
practices in factor analytic interpretation suggest that independent
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factors have a minimum of three indicators to deﬁne a dimension, a
factor analysis with seven items can only maximally be able to interpret
meaningfully two factors (Russell, 2002).
2. Scope and strategy of analysis
Considering the various empirical and theoretical classiﬁcations and
respective methodological weaknesses, the current study, with the aim
of overcoming such limits, introduced a three-step analysis procedure
in order to develop more inclusive H&B dimensions. We started from
theoretical bias classiﬁcations. Since the current literature presents>
100 types of biases, often studied in isolation, taxonomies were cer-
tainly a good starting point for sampling H&B categories. Therefore, a
Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) for determining the presence
of common H&B classes among taxonomies was initially performed.
The Multiple Correspondence approach allows addressing taxonomical
limits concerning the lack of a common criterion for theoretical cate-
gorization and the presence of diﬀerent labels among classes. In this
way, through a replicable procedure of bias selection we managed also
to overcome the ﬁrst abovementioned empirical limitation (I). Hence,
at least two biases for every detected MCA dimension were selected
with the intention of covering a larger range of biases from existing
taxonomies by addressing the second empirical limit above reported
(II). An exploratory Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was next
conducted for testing interrelations between bias of the extracted MCA
dimensions. This procedure was particularly suggested since it allows
considering multicausality of biases due to overlapping in the extracted
components. Finally, we tested the identiﬁed PCA solution using a
Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for enhancing results' consistency.
2.1. Participants and procedure
Two-hundred eighty-nine volunteer students (age range
18–35 years, 65% females) were recruited from a mid-sized Italian
university. Participants were asked to complete a battery of decision-
making problems. The survey was designed using the opensource
platform Limesurvey. Respondents expressed their preferences for
every task. When they had to choose between two options, the pre-
ference was distributed along a digital visual analogue scale based on
100 points. This procedure is particularly indicated for decision-making
tasks, especially for the measurement of susceptibility to Anchoring
heuristic (Guyatt, Townsend, Berman, & Keller, 1987; Slugoski et al.,
1993). Moreover, task order was randomized for avoiding priming ef-
fects and learning eﬀects (see Khorramdel & Frebort, 2011). The survey
was divided across two sessions since some tasks (Type-B)3 presented
two versions of the same problem. The use of separate sessions was
instituted to minimize memory eﬀects between parallel versions of the
task (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Levin et al., 1998). Each section
lasted approximately 1 h, there was a one-hour break between the
sessions.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)
In order to perform a MCA, existing taxonomies and classiﬁcations
with more than two dimensions were used to select H&B on the most
comprehensive dimensions (i.e., Arnott, 2006; Baron, 2000; Carter
et al., 2007; Gilovich et al., 2002; Oreg & Bayazit, 2009; Stanovich
et al., 2008). Multiple Correspondence Analysis is an exploratory de-
scriptive method; the multivariate extension of the Correspondence
Analysis for analyzing tables containing three or more variables. It can
be considered as a generalization of PCA for categorical variables which
reveal patterning in complex data sets without requiring an assumption
of underlying normality (Ayele, Zewotir, & Mwambi, 2014). We ﬁrst
created a contingency table through the row and column proﬁles, in
which rows correspond to the relative frequencies for the diﬀerent
taxonomy's categories for each H&B selected. Expect for biases identical
but diﬀerent in labels (e.g., Illusion of Superiority and Better than
average eﬀect; Base rate fallacy and Base rate neglect; Distinction bias
and Presentation bias, etc.) all biases present in chosen taxonomies
were retained (n=119). The resulted multiple correspondence pattern
showed that with 70% of cumulative inertia,2 seven dimensions could
explain much of the variance. Based on this preliminary result, we se-
lected at least two representative H&B for each MCA's dimension (see
Table 2). Moreover, such a selection of biases was based on the possible
measurability and adaptability for a within-subjects study (see Table 3).
This led to a total of 17 H&B and related tasks investigated.
3.2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
All selected H&B tasks showed the overall signiﬁcant eﬀect in the
direction of the predicted bias. H&B scores were calculated by the de-
gree to which a participant demonstrated a heuristic or bias response
(i.e., deviation from the normative solution) for each task (Aczel et al.,
2015).3 Scores were standardized and then subsequently used for the
PCA. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.
Principal Component Analysis was preferred over other reduction
techniques because of the heterogeneity of theoretical models, leaving
us with a lack of prior knowledge regarding variables load on any given
dimension (Conway & Huﬀcutt, 2003). Analyses were conducted with
an oblique rotation to allow for component intercorrelations with a
one-, two-, three-component solution until seven components (as sug-
gested by the MCA results) in order to determine the most interpretable
solution. Based on a visual inspection of the scree plot, a three or four-
factor solution seemed reasonable, where the ﬁrst three components
(with eigenvalues > 1.5) explained the 32.10% of variance. The four-
component included only two items decomposed from the ﬁrst prin-
cipal factor, which makes that interpretability of the dimension con-
strained (Russell, 2002). Beyond this diﬀerence, the factor loadings and
components included in each recovered dimension were relatively un-
changed. Moreover, the three components showed no signiﬁcant cor-
relations between them (see Table 5).
We next conducted a parallel analysis, a Monte-Carlo simulation of
eigenvalues, in order to determine the optimal number of components
to retain. In the current analysis, 1000 random dataset were generated
(95% CI) with the same number of cases and variables as the original
dataset. According to the comparison between mean eigenvalues ob-
tained with the observed eigenvalues from study, we retained the three-
component solution over the four-component solution. Besides such
reasons, the three-component solution was preferred for the theoretical
interpretation of the dimensions found.
In next section, we describe the extracted components and provide a
brief interpretation of each. We discuss the interpretation of these
components, along with how they relate to the individual diﬀerences
approach, in the General discussion.
2 General rules in MCA suggest that the number of dimensions retained
should be higher of 70% of the inertia explained or correspond to the number
right before the “elbow” of the eigenvalues by dimension number of scree plot
(see Sourial et al., 2010).
3 Aczel et al. (2015) suggest three ways for calculating biases' score (here we
present the main two, i.e., Type-A and Type-B). Type-A: In this type of task, a
single question is diagnostic to the person's susceptibility to violating the given
normative rule by indicating suboptimal reasoning; Type-B: For these tasks, the
answer to the given question can be regarded as indicating the person's decision
bias only in relation to a similar version of the same question. Therefore, the
task is made of two questions in a within-subjects design. For both types, if
several versions of the same task are used, the sum of scores corresponds to the
total score.
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3.2.1. Characterizing three empirical H&B dimensions
3.2.1.1. First dimension. In this category, a common feature of H&B is
that normative responses diﬀer from recalled representations when
making a judgment. This includes the accessibility of examples and the
comparative similarity to a generated representation (e.g.,
Representativeness heuristic, Imaginability bias). These biases share a
common theme; they appear to be dependent on using information that
is recalled easily and relevant for comparative judgments. For such a
reason, biased responding includes both the Availability heuristic and
Imaginability bias. The recovery of this dimension reinforces what
previously observed concerning the presence of a possible association
between the Availability and Representativeness heuristics (Slugoski
et al., 1993). However, we also found that violations of statistical rules
due to representativeness (e.g., the Base rate fallacy, Conjunction
fallacy, Gambler's fallacy) loaded on the present component.
Stanovich et al. (2008) classiﬁes these H&B as deriving from
Mindware gaps. Mindware gaps long have been implicated in the H&B
as a source of judgmental errors and are related to the underuse or lack
of reasoning strategies such as probabilistic reasoning or logical in-
ference, rather than a conﬂict between System 1 and System 2 processes
(see Stanovich, 2009). We discuss this relationship and implications
with individual diﬀerences further in the General Discussion.
3.2.1.2. Second dimension. The second extracted component reﬂected a
bipolar dimension. At one pole, there were the Endowment eﬀect, Time
discounting, and biases based on costs sustained (i.e., Extra cost eﬀect
and Sunk costs eﬀect). These fallacies share some aspects such as the
tendency to overvalue costs sustained and overestimate the intrinsic
value of the losing experience. Some studies have suggested this pattern
of association between the loss experience and the sensitivity toward
sunk costs. For instance, Frisch and Jones (1993) found that young
adults reported an aversion to losses as the main reason they were
prone to the Sunk costs eﬀect. Additionally, Soman and Cheema (2001)
considered an aversion to losses (i.e., Endowment eﬀect) as a potential
explanation for the Sunk costs eﬀect. On the other pole, with opposite
sign, we found biases related to an overly optimistic view of the world,
which bear similarity to the dimension of Positive Illusions (Taylor &
Brown, 1988).
Further, this bipolar conﬁguration resonates with prior research
supporting the association between optimistic-approach tendencies and
an avoidance inclination strictly connected to loss and risk avoidance
(Chapman & Polkovnichenko, 2009; De Palma et al., 2008; Lee, Aaker,
& Gardner, 2000). According to the literature on Negativity eﬀect
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001), the greater consideration of costs and losses
comes with the principle of negative potency and with Prospect Theory.
Those with this avoidance orientation will be more likely to make
biased decisions – as predicted by Prospect Theory – by exhibiting risk-
averse behavior with respect to avoid losses and in general negative
outcomes (e.g., Sunk costs fallacy, Endowment eﬀect). On the other
hand, those with an approach orientation will be more likely to make
decisions aimed at enhancing gains and risks, by manifesting biases
featured by an unrealistic optimistic vision of reality and of themselves
(e.g., Optimism bias, Better than average eﬀect).
Finally, consistent with Oreg and Bayazit (2009), these biases be-
long to the two interconnected dimensions, labeled Veriﬁcation and
Regulation biases. As stated by authors “individuals' biased interpretations
of their situation (i.e., Veriﬁcation biases) directly relates to their choices
and actions with respect to how they approach pleasure or avoid pain (i.e.,
Regulation biases)” (p. 189). For instance, people who tend to perceive
optimistically even low probability of success would be more inclined
to assume risks for seeking rewards and positive emotions. Based on the
present theoretical support, as combination between the two Oreg and
Bayazit's categories, we named this dimension “Valuation biases”.
Moreover, as reported by the PCA, this category, in turn, is composed of
other two opposite classes on the same continuum: Positive Illusions
and Negativity eﬀect.Ta
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Table 3
Description of H&B tasks used. Task scoring is based on the Aczel et al. (2015) bias eﬀect computing.3
H&B and representative citations Task description and type scoring method used
Anchoring heuristic (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974)
The Anchoring heuristic was tested by using a task created by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Participants were
asked ﬁve questions requiring a numeric answer. Later on, the same task was presented again but changing the
value in the ﬁrst question in order to assess the eﬀect of both high and low anchors. For instance: “Is the percentage
of African countries in the United Nations greater or < 65?” and then “how many African countries are represented in
the United Nations?” Later on, in the survey, the same task was presented again but changing the value in the ﬁrst
question. The sum of the diﬀerences between the two versions quantiﬁed the degree to which individuals showed
the eﬀect (Type B).
Availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) Starting from an experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) to study this heuristic we asked with three items to
rate the chance of death by two causes. The sum of the scores of more available options has been used to estimate
the degree of the heuristic eﬀect (Type-A).
Base rate fallacy (Kahneman et al., 1982) We used another well-known experiment: the Taxicab problem; A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at
night. “Two cab companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15%
are Blue. A witness identiﬁed the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the same circumstances
that existed on the night of the accident and concluded that the witness correctly identiﬁed each one of the two colors 80%
of the time and failed 20% of the time. What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather than
Green knowing that this witness identiﬁed it as Blue?” (Type-A).
Better than average eﬀect (McKenna, 1993) Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of being in three diﬀerent types of car incident, and in two diﬀerent
situations: one where they had car control and in a situation in which control was given to a hypothetic average
driver. The sum of the diﬀerences between the two versions quantiﬁed the degree to which individuals showed the
eﬀect (Type-B).
Conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) We presented the classical Linda problem and asked participants which option was the most likely. “Linda is
31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations: a. Linda is a bank teller;
b. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.” (Type-A).
Distinction bias (Hsee & Zhang, 2004) To test this bias we adapted a scenario from Hsee and Zhang (2004) in which participants were asked to quantify
their level of satisfaction in four imagined situation where stimuli were presented in joint versus separate
evaluation. “Imagine that their favorite hobby is writing poems and that they had compiled a book of their poems and
were trying to sell it on campus. So far no one has bought your book/So far 240 people have bought your book.” (Type-B).
Endowment eﬀect (Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann, 2007) To test for Endowment eﬀect, we adopted a speciﬁc task created to relieve the individual level of endowment in
choices. Materials resembled those previously used by Gächter et al. (2007). Participants had to state their
willingness to buy and sell hypothetical objects at nine diﬀerent prices. WTA-WTP diﬀerence has been used to
compute the magnitude eﬀect (Type-B).
Extra cost eﬀect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) The Extra-cost eﬀect was tested by using a scenario from Tversky and Kahneman (1981): “Imagine that you have
decided to see a play where admission is $10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that you have lost a $10 bill.
Would you still pay $10 for a ticket for the play?” Participants were presented an alternative version of the scenario
where they have lost the ticket. We computed the diﬀerence between the two responses given by participants
(Type-B).
Framing eﬀect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) It was tested by using the Asian disease risky choice problem in two diﬀerent sessions. “The ﬁrst group of
participants was presented with a choice between programs: In a group of 600 people: Program A: “200 people will be
saved”; Program B: “there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved, and a two-thirds probability that no
people will be saved.” 72 percent of participants preferred program A” Then the second version negative framed was
used (Type-B).
Gambler's fallacy (Hogarth, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman,
1973)
Participants were asked to estimate the chance of obtaining the head face of a coin after a sequence of 20 tosses in
which the results were always tail. The score was obtaining by considering the deviation from the normative
response, equal to 50% of probability (Type-A).
Imaginability bias (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, &
Reynolds, 1985)
Imaginability was tested by using a manipulated version of the experiment carried out by Sherman et al. (1985).
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of being contaminated by a more or less imaginable disease. “An
illness called Hypo-A is becoming increasingly prevalent in your city. The symptoms of this disease are: low energy level,
muscle aches, and frequent severe headaches. Now judge how likely it you could contract Hypo-A in the future. ‘An illness
called Scenia-B is becoming increasingly prevalent in your city. The symptoms of this disease are: vague sense of
disorientation, a malfunctioning nervous system and an inﬂamed liver.’ Now judge how likely it you could contract
Scenia-B in the future.” (Type-B).
Optimism bias (Sharot et al., 2011) In order to estimate the tendency of each participant to be optimist or pessimist, we adapted an experiment
proposed by Sharot et al. (2011). Authors presented a set of questions with the aim of registering the change of
estimation for a particular event, before and after presenting information about the average probability of
incurring in similar events. We presented seven questions used in the original experiment across two diﬀerent
sessions. The aim was to record participants' change of estimation for a particular event, before and after
presenting information about the average probability of incurring in similar events (Type-B).
Reference price (Thaler, 1985) To test this bias we used an adapted version of the scenario previously proposed by Thaler (1985). Participants
were asked what price they were willing to pay for a drink bought in a grocery store. In the second scenario, the
grocery store was changed with a fancy resort hotel. Then, the diﬀerence between prices that participants were
willing to pay in the two versions, was measured. “You are lying on the beach on a hot day. All you have to drink is ice
water. For the last hour you have been thinking about how much you would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favorite brand
of beer. A companion gets up to make a phone call and oﬀers to bring back a beer from the only nearby place where beer is
sold, a small, run-down grocery store. He says that the beer might be expensive and so asks how much you are willing to
pay for the beer. He says that he will buy the beer if it costs as much or less than the price you state. But if it costs more
than the price you state he will not buy it. You trust your friend, and there is no possibility of bargaining with the store
owner. What price do you tell him?” (Type-B).
Regression toward the mean (Ferguson, 1987) On the basis of the studies run by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and of Kahneman's experience with ﬂight
instructors, the Regression toward the mean was tested presenting participants with a simulation story of pilots
and asking them the possible causes of decrement on pilot performance between two ﬂight sessions (Type-A).
(continued on next page)
A. Ceschi et al. Personality and Individual Differences xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
7
3.2.1.3. Third dimension. Heuristics and biases belonging to the last
component share a common theme of reference point dependence, for
such a reason it was named “Anchoring and Adjustment”. Anchoring
and insuﬃcient adjustment is the tendency of subjects to be inﬂuenced
by a reference point. Anchoring processes may also inﬂuence
Regression toward the mean eﬀect. Regression toward the mean is
often considered a statistical bias due to a non-consideration of the
statistical phenomenon of regression, which may reﬂect a tendency of
people to exclude other points of view and diﬀerent options that may
increase adjustment from the salient extreme score. In contrast,
Stanovich (2009) included this bias in the proposed “Focal bias” class
with other Anchoring and Adjustment biases. Focal bias is a useful
concept to explain why people focus on reference points without
considering alternatives; reference points and all subsequent thought
allow economizing cognitive resources compared to alternative
strategies that require more computationally taxing operations.
Overall, the presence of this dimension is not surprising, since that
several taxonomies, included such biases in the same class but with
diﬀerent names (e.g., “Underadjustment”, “Anchoring contamination
and Compatibility”, etc.). Somewhat surprising instead is that the
Framing eﬀect primarily loaded on this component, rather than on
Valuation biases. However, consistent with one of the primary tenets of
Prospect Theory, prospects are compared to the reference point, with
steeper curvatures of the utility function for losses compared to gains
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
3.3. Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed on the re-
lationships indicated in the PCA. Since there was not suﬃcient
Table 3 (continued)
H&B and representative citations Task description and type scoring method used
Representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) To test this heuristic, a problem used by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) was re-adapted. In the original
experiment, participants were asked to judge what kind of job a person is more likely to do. The judgment is based
on a description of the person and participants are also provided with the statistics about jobs across the
population (Type-A).
Sunk costs fallacy (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) This fallacy was tested using a simple scenario created by Arkes and Blumer (1985) on a realistic life experience.
“On your way home you buy a TV dinner on sale for $3 at the local grocery store. Then you get an idea. You call up your
friend to ask if he would like to come over for a quick TV dinner and then watch a good movie on TV. Your friend says,
‘Sure.’ So you go out to buy a second TV dinner. However, all the on-sale TV dinners are gone. You therefore have to
spend $5 (the regular price) for a TV dinner identical to the one you just bought for $3. You go home and put both dinners
in the oven. When the two dinners are fully cooked, you get a phone call. Your friend is ill and cannot come. You are not
hungry enough to eat both dinners. You cannot freeze one. You must eat one and discard the other. Which one do you
eat?” (Type-B).
Time discounting (Laibson, 1997; Read, 2001) Participants chose between receiving several bigger rewards in the future or smaller at present. For example: “Do
you prefer receive 50$ now or 100$ after a year/Do you prefer receive 50$ after 5 years or 100$ after 6 years.” (Type-
B).
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of H&B tested.
H&B Min Max Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
Anchoring heuristic 10 263 108.34 47.63 0.55 −0.05
Availability heuristic 0 248 131.20 49.53 −0.36 −0.16
Base rate fallacy 0 98 50.77 31.28 −0.10 −1.63
Better than average eﬀect −176 215 1.76 63.18 0.03 0.23
Endowment eﬀect –51 955 14.84 21.20 −0.71 0.67
Conjunction fallacy 0 100 66.87 30.89 −0.83 −0.61
Distinction bias −132 180 52.46 57.66 −0.27 0.14
Extra cost eﬀect −100 98 13.30 34.36 0.23 0.51
Framing eﬀect −100 100 25.47 41.16 −0.58 0.33
Gambler's fallacy 0 100 70.13 31.78 −0.92 −0.47
Imaginability bias –59 91 16.51 30.38 0.04 −0.12
Optimism bias −286 136 −54.22 76.61 −0.56 0.36
Reference price –4.8 5 0.19 1.52 −0.01 1.33
Regression toward the mean 0 100 74.93 22.75 −1.00 0.72
Representativeness heuristic 0 98 62.52 17.58 −0.77 0.43
Sunk costs fallacy 0 100 63.86 30.43 −0.57 −0.62
Time discounting −197 200 86.00 83.45 −0.44 −0.37
Table 5
Rotated component matrixes (four-components on the left and three-components on the right) of the H&B tested and Screen Plot of solutions extracted.
H&B 1 2 3 4 H&B 1 2 3
Imaginability bias .697 Conjunction fallacy .566
Gambler’s fallacy .573 Gambler’s fallacy .552
Conjunction fallacy .554 Availability heuristic .530
Availability heuristic .515 Representativeness heuristic .523
Distinction bias .511 Base rate fallacy .521
Sunk costs fallacy .596 Imaginability bias .516
Time discounting .587 Distinction bias .512
Better than average eﬀect -.570 Sunk costs fallacy .597
Optimism bias -.558 Time discounting .587
Endowment eﬀect .459 Better than average eﬀect -.569
Extra-cost eﬀect .448 . Optimism bias -.558
Anchoring heuristic .725 Endowment eﬀect .457
Reference price .676 Extra-cost eﬀect .453
Regression toward the mean .460 Anchoring heuristic .689
Framing eﬀect .445 Reference price .660
Representativeness heuristic .697 Regression toward the mean .497
Base rate fallacy .632 Framing eﬀect .481
Note. N=289. Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Preliminary assessment revealed a KMO
value of 0.59, and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity was signiﬁcant, indicating that the minimum criteria for the PCA were met. None of the oﬀ-diagonal items presented
correlations of> 0.90, suggesting no evidence of multicollinearity. The communality estimate resulted in an average of 0.39. Coeﬃcient values below 0.40 were
suppressed.
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theoretical basis, we tested the same data for cross-validation purposes
(see Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999; Van Prooijen &
Van Der Kloot, 2001). Indeed, we tested the validity of the solution
found with the restrictions implied by the CFA (e.g., ﬁxed cross-load-
ings, measurement errors, etc., see Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).
The ﬁrst CFA performed showed adequate ﬁt indexes:
χ2(103)= 120.72 (p= .112), CFI= 0.938, TLI= 0.918,
RMSEA=0.024 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). On the other hand, even if
the ﬁrst model resulted statistically acceptable, we preferred test a
diﬀerent conﬁguration. As reported in the theoretical interpretation,
since the Framing eﬀect was expected to load in the Valuation biases
dimension, we modeled the relationship between these variables. Re-
sults of the new conﬁguration showed a better model ﬁt:
χ2(102)= 115.69 (p= .167), CFI= 0.952, TLI= 0.936,
RMSEA=0.022. Moreover, we conﬁrmed the consistency and the in-
dependence of the dimensions found together with the signiﬁcativity of
most the H&B relationships found (Fig. 1).
4. General discussion
This research aimed to empirically identify underlying relationships
between diﬀerent H&B for clustering them. Such ﬁndings are in line
with several theorizations on the H&B taxonomies (Arnott, 2006;
Baron, 2000; Carter et al., 2007; Gilovich et al., 2002; Oreg & Bayazit,
2009; Stanovich et al., 2008) and cognitive models which suggest the
presence of more than two dimensions of biases (see Stanovich, 2009).
Our dimensional account is strictly connected to the H&B tasks selected
to compose the resulted solution, which it is based on a more com-
prehensive set of cognitive biases in comparison with the previous
studies (Teovanović et al., 2015; Weaver & Stewart, 2012).
A peculiarity of this research relies in the procedure adopted. Since
the deﬁnitive number of cognitive biases was not known (e.g., Baron,
2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), random sampling from the domain
was not possible. To enhance sample representativeness, a hetero-
geneous set of phenomena that covered various dimensions in alter-
native theoretical taxonomies was selected (Arnott, 2006; Baron, 2000;
Carter et al., 2007; Gilovich et al., 2002; Oreg & Bayazit, 2009;
Stanovich et al., 2008). Following, starting from multiple correspon-
dence patterns, a multi-item instrument collecting measures of in-
dividual diﬀerences in various cognitive biases was developed. All
surveyed tasks were based on examples found in previous studies and
adapted to within-subject study design (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 1985;
Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; Sharot, Korn, &
Dolan, 2011; Thaler, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The mixed
method used (MCA/PCA/CFA) for this classiﬁcation has the potential of
overcoming to limits of empirical solutions and theoretical taxonomies
present in the literature. Moreover, it embodies qualities of diﬀerent
approaches and evidence of H&B clusters. In this sense, the solution
Fig. 1. Conﬁrmatory factor analysis of the three H&B dimensions: Mindware gaps, Valuation biases, Anchoring and Adjustment.
Note. N= 289. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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obtained is important, as a conﬁrmation of some theoretical H&B di-
mensions, but also for other two reasons. Within-subject design in H&B
can be used to detect diﬀerent response patterns among individuals,
considering that “for a long time they were largely ignored and treated as
noise” (Oreg & Bayazit, 2009, p. 175). But more importantly, individual
diﬀerences in H&B appear to exist, and conform to a dimensional ac-
count which may shed light on common processes that thread certain
biases together.
4.1. Studies on H&B and individual diﬀerences: considerations in support of
the dimensions detected
4.1.1. Mindware gaps, simpliﬁcation processes, System 2 failing and the
role of cognitive skills
We found that the ﬁrst dimension of H&B was composed of
Mindware gaps, the result of shortcuts easy to retrieve (i.e., Availability
heuristic) or of judgments based on similarity (i.e., Representativeness
heuristic). Likely occurrences or similar ones are easier to imagine than
unlikely ones, and associate connections are strengthened when two
events frequently co-occur, these ﬁndings reinforce theoretical asser-
tions that such biases represent common underlying mechanisms.
Mindwares represent common evaluations processes, often inaccurate
and suboptimal, that individuals make when they are trying to under-
stand daily events in their lives. They represent the mechanism through
which people try to achieve an easier and comprehensible (even if not
always accurate) image of the world. For example, the Base rate fallacy
happens when people attribute some illustrative qualities to general
sample's characteristics by neglecting the sample's size in favor of re-
presentativeness. In doing so, the individual discards relevant prob-
abilistic information, whereas available descriptive information and
easily accessible one is more accounted in such a process.
Oreg and Bayazit (2009) suggest that individuals incur in these
biases by simplifying environmental information through the use of
some classic heuristics. Basically, by paying more attention to in-
formation that is readily available or is most representative of target
stimuli, classic mental errors would be prompted. These Simpliﬁcation
biases (also present in this dimension) stem from the misuse of these
processes, such as: Conjunction fallacy, Gambler's fallacy, Base rate
fallacy, and deviations in Bayesian reasoning, such as Base rate fallacy,
but also two important heuristics such as Availability and Representa-
tiveness. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) already thought that
when people are judging how likely an event is by availability, one
treats the most easily recalled characteristics of an event as being di-
agnostic of the frequency that it will occur.
Overall, these fallacies are basically outcomes of the failing of ra-
tionality in its forms (i.e., Coherence or Normative) which sustains the
System 2 (Stanovich, 2009). These types of biases rely mostly on in-
suﬃcient application or knowledge retrieved by System 2, such as logic,
statistical knowledge, and scientiﬁc reasoning. Stanovich et al. (2008)
sustain that people can show less or more inclination toward mindware
gaps in relation to their cognitive skills. Indeed, the occurrence of these
biases would be mostly dependent by the availability of cognitive re-
sources that regulate the capacity to process complex information using
analytical processes, which is almost the deﬁnition of cognitive ability
(Oechssler et al., 2009).
4.1.2. Valuation biases between avoidance and approach orientations
If we consider the Valuation biases category, we can establish the
presence of biases based on aﬀective judgments regarding negative
outcomes (i.e., Negativity eﬀect), or characterized by unrealistic opti-
mism (i.e., Positive Illusions). The pole featured by the presence of cost
and loss biases is resumable by the “Do Not Waste” heuristic, which is
deﬁned as the perception of being more eﬃcient in cost management,
to attribute high importance to the costs sustained, and an aversion
toward waste of resources (Arkes, 1996; Arkes & Ayton, 1999). The
disposition toward high-perception of losses is also present in time
management. The aversion is documented in a study conducted by Fox
(2013). In conducting an empirical experiment, he showed that people
who report loss aversion manifest the same condition when they have
to choose between diﬀerent situations over time. Overall, ﬁndings
showed that the diﬀerence in measured time preference between frames
increases based on the person's degree of monetary loss aversion. This
evidence could explain the presence of Time discounting in the same
Valuation biases component.
Indeed, the disposition of feeling an aversion toward wasting is
strictly connected to some emotional states. Sunk-costs and losses elicit
negative emotions in people who feel fear or a sense of guilt regarding
violations of a No-Waste principle (Fujino et al., 2016). Moreover,
neuroscience research has shown how Cost biases elicit stronger ne-
gative emotions in individuals engaged to follow norms (Hafenbrack,
Kinias, & Barsade, 2014). People who are exhibiting higher insula ac-
tivation during decision-making show higher loss avoidance, speciﬁ-
cally in the dorsal anterior, which plays a role in negative emotional
processing (Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Kuhnen
& Knutson, 2005; Samanez-Larkin, Hollon, Carstensen, & Knutson,
2008). On the contrary, the imagination of positive events, compared to
negative ones, is enhanced by the activation in the amygdala of the
rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps,
2007), and where the same brain region is implicated in optimism trait
development and preservation toward negative thinking (Nunes,
Sullivan, & Levin, 2004). Such results would be in line with the Gray's
(1990) theory which presents an approach-and avoidance-related mo-
tivation derived by two distinct neuro-subsystems. Whereas the beha-
vioral inhibition system is believed to control an avoidance-motivation
toward to negative outcomes, the behavioral activation system controls
an approach-motivation responsible for the experience of positive
emotions such as optimism and hope and willingness to accept risks
(Gray, 1982).
In light of this, considering the presence of opposite poles in this
dimension, it is possible to have people that present opposite char-
acteristics and diﬀerent H&B as well. If negative emotional processing
induces people to evaluate more possible losses, at the other side of the
continuum, optimism can aﬀect people's judgments inducing to an
under-evaluation of costs and a willingness to accept risks. Studies
showed how optimism bias correlates with perceptions of lower risk in
diﬀerent domains (e.g., health, driving, ﬁnancial, etc.), and less concern
and less taking precautions against such risks (Davidson & Prkachin,
1997; DeJoy, 1989; Hoorens & Buunk, 1993; Klein, 1996; Radcliﬀe &
Klein, 2002; Sharot, 2011; Weinstein, 1989). On the other hand, the
motivation to self-verify exists also when people prefer to maintain
negative self-views than to adopt a positive, yet incongruent, view of
the self (Giesler et al., 1996). A negative and accurate self-view can
often serve to protect the individual from engaging in activities in
which is likely to fail. These diﬀerences suggest that given the same
decision situation involving risk or uncertainty, people can actually
exhibit diﬀerent biases based on their approach and avoidance in-
clinations which will distort their ways of perceiving the reality and
subsequent outcomes.
4.1.3. Anchoring and Adjustment and not only individual diﬀerences
The third dimension (Anchoring and Adjustment) is based uniquely
on a reference-point dependence expressed through numeric informa-
tion. This component might reﬂect the presence of diﬀerences in
dealing with numbers (Welsh, Delfabbro, Burns, & Begg, 2007). Un-
expectedly, even if most anchoring tasks involve numeric estimation,
the literature on anchoring and individual diﬀerences does not show
consistent evidence on the role of numeric competences (Yoon & Fong,
2010). More in general, studies which investigated the relationship
between cognitive ability and anchoring found that anchoring de-
creases with higher cognitive ability (Bergman et al., 2010). Another
ascertained role in individual diﬀerences and anchoring eﬀect is due to
personality and big ﬁve traits (e.g., subjects high in conscientiousness
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and in agreeableness are more susceptible to the anchoring eﬀect; see
Furnham & Boo, 2011). In particular, individuals with high levels of
openness to experience trait are more sensitive to anchor cues. Judg-
ments of those individuals high in this trait are more inﬂuenced by
anchors previously presented, whereas those individuals low in this
trait are less inﬂuenced by the anchor (McElroy & Dowd, 2007). This is
in line with Teovanović et al. (2015) results' study, who recognize in it
the disposition in changing the initial answers, toward subsequently
given external information, the expression of feedback responsiveness
and calibrated judgments. Such an explanation relies on the deﬁnition
of Ecological rationality (i.e., the ability to exploit the structure of the
information in natural environments; Gigerenzer, Hoﬀrage, &
Kleinbölting, 1991) which may involve also some personality disposi-
tions. On the other hand, an eﬀect such as anchoring cannot be ex-
plained only by individual diﬀerences, but also by other general
knowledge (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell, & Macy,
2008), expertise about the topic used to test the bias (Wegener, Petty,
Detweiler-Bedell, & Jarvis, 2001), mood, self-regulation (Englich &
Soder, 2009) and in general by less stable characteristics.
5. Future directions and limitations
Although these results are promising, we must acknowledge several
limitations that could represent the focus of future research. First, to
reduce participant burden, our individual indicators for each H&B were
limited to a small set, or a single-item. This limits our ability to address
the internal consistency of the underlying tasks used in this study.
However, it is important to note that repeated-measures of H&B often
show acceptable internal consistency when multiple items are used to
assess the same construct (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Second, we
were able to include only a subset of H&B that are present in the lit-
erature. Future research can help to clarify further the content validity
of each dimension. Third, as individual diﬀerences capable of ex-
plaining dimensions found, we mostly considered personality, inclina-
tions or cognitive skills and we showed also how they can even interact
together to determine such processes (e.g., cognitive and personality
traits in Anchoring and Adjustment). On the other hand, socio-demo-
graphic characteristics such as age or gender, education level, work
experiences, etc. which might have a role in H&B emergence were not
explored as possible bias predictors. Expect for the relationship between
gender and H&B – which it has not showed consistent results in lit-
erature yet – for variables such as age or education, the motivation
relies on low variability of these variables, since the sample is com-
posed of students. Finally, a replication of this dimensional account is
needed in an independent sample in order to test its robustness. This is
an important and needed step before beginning to establish convergent
and predictive associations between these speciﬁc dimensions and
other variables of interest.
6. Conclusion and practical implications
The utility of this study and its contribution on individual-diﬀerence
decision-making paradigm in the academic research is related to the
possibility of developing a wider and more comprehensive taxonomy of
H&B, still grounded on an evidence-based approach. Adopting evi-
dence-based categories of H&B may allow future research to investigate
more precisely the presence of multiple processes in decision-making
against the idea of a single Decision-Making Competence (see Ceschi,
Costantini, Phillips, & Sartori, 2017; Ceschi, Demerouti, Sartori, &
Weller, 2017). On the other hand, even if the present study showed the
presence of consistent relationships between some traits and H&B, most
of the variance still remains unexplained by leaving room to other
possible predictors (e.g., expertise, tacit knowledge, self-regulation
mood, etc. Which have proved to have a role in the Anchoring and
Adjustment). Such variables, in comparison to individual diﬀerences,
may be developable characteristics, which would be possible to train in
order to avoid certain H&B (i.e., Debiasing program; see Larrick, 2004).
Understanding strategies by which individuals approach decisions and
improve them has relevant implications for physical, mental, and ﬁ-
nancial well-being. It is important to recall how several studies have
shown that the tendency to respond irrationally is associated with
problematic behaviors and outcomes across the lifespan (Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007; Peters, Dieckmann, & Weller, 2011; Weller, Levin,
Rose, & Bossard, 2012). Programs designed to promote better decision-
making through teaching debiasing strategies might consider present
evidence-based dimensions of H&B for organizing the training and have
better in impact on real-world decision outcomes.
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